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JANICE NADLER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
When we assign blame for something bad that happened, we are doing 
something social—we are identifying another human being who caused harm, 
without justification or excuse. A window broken by a hurricane elicits a story 
about cause, but not a story about blame; a window broken by a person elicits 
blame attribution. Once a human agent is identified, we naturally turn our 
attention to blame severity, a complex judgment shaped by several different 
concerns. A window broken by a child’s stray baseball is assessed differently 
from a window broken by a vandal, or by a burglar, or by a white supremacist. 
Assessing blame involves not only determining the badness of the harm (for 
example, property damage versus injured person), but also the badness of the 
actor’s mental state (for example, accident versus intentional), and perhaps 
even the badness of the actor’s motive (for example, general destructiveness 
versus racial hatred). When viewed this way, we see that blame—as a 
psychological matter—involves attributions about other people and the extent 
to which they intend to harm us or otherwise pose a threat to the social order. 
In this sense, blaming is social because it is about attributions of other people 
and their intentions. 
The law takes account of each of the blame dimensions just mentioned. The 
criminal law reserves more severe offense categories for more severe harm. It 
imposes more serious liability when mens rea is more culpable, all else being 
equal. And sometimes, as is the case with hate crimes, it explicitly takes into 
account the actor’s motive for causing harm. But there is another possible 
influence on blame not yet mentioned—an influence which the law has sought 
to minimize. The moral character of the actor, apart from that actor’s motive or 
reasons for acting, might play an important role—as a descriptive matter—in 
the psychological process of blame. Yet, for the most part, the law eschews the 
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role of moral character in legal blame.1 
In a previous article, my colleague and I explored empirically the question 
of motive for acting, and how it produces inferences about moral character that 
influence blame judgments.2 By contrast, the first overarching goal of the 
current article is to provide experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that psychological blame is influenced by perceptions of the actor’s overall 
virtue or lack thereof, even apart from the actor’s reason for acting in the 
specific instance. This article marshals experimental evidence to support the 
idea that a person with a flawed moral character is blamed more for causing 
harm than a person who is otherwise virtuous. Thus, we are likely to blame 
more severely a drug-addicted high school dropout who knocks down ten rural 
mailboxes with a baseball bat than an A-student who is on the chess team who 
engages in the same action. Similarly, we are likely to blame more severely an 
abusive parent who drives recklessly and unintentionally hits a pedestrian than 
a model parent who performs the same act with the same mens rea. The 
experiment reported here implements a rigorous test of this hypothesis and 
shows that even mildly unpleasant character traits, such as unreliability, can 
lead observers to blame more harshly, and to bolster these harsh blame 
judgments with increased perceptions of the actor’s causal role and his intent to 
cause harm. 
The findings reported here echo research examining criminal cases 
suggesting that the defendant’s prior criminal record can influence jury verdicts. 
For example, in cases where evidence is weak, there is a positive correlation 
between the jury learning that the defendant had committed prior crimes and 
the likelihood of conviction.3 This suggests that in the absence of compelling 
evidence tending to prove guilt, juries sometimes use the fact that defendants 
had committed prior crimes as a reason to think they might be guilty of the 
crimes in question. Existing experimental research also suggests that 
information about prior crimes can increase the likelihood of criminal 
 
 1. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (permitting admission of evidence of the defendant’s bad 
character only when it is used in specific rebuttal to evidence of good character submitted by the 
defense). By contrast, the criminal law embraces the consideration of the defendant’s character in 
sentencing judgments. For example, the U.S. Code provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). In practice, the Presentence Investigation Report “may contain a 
wide range of information about the defendant, all of which may be considered by the court in 
determining the sentence.” Sentencing Guidelines, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 681, 725 
n.2161 (2009). For a dissenting view, see Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing 
Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1019 (2003). The focus in this article is primarily on blame, rather than punishment judgments. 
 2. Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of 
Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255 (2012).  
 3. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of 
a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 
1388 (2009) (noting that data suggest that disclosure of prior crimes increases the chances of conviction 
in close cases). 
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conviction.4 These findings are important, but they focus on the narrow 
question of the influence of prior crimes on verdicts in criminal cases. By 
contrast, the focus of this article is more expansive. First, the focus here is on 
the influence of moral character broadly, not just on inferences drawn from 
prior crimes.5 Instead of examining the effect of an emotionally provocative 
criminal violation of the social contract, such as the influence of the defendant’s 
prior armed robbery, this article focuses on subtle cues about the actor’s 
character traits, such as generosity and reliability, and shows that even mild 
virtue deficits lead to more severe blame judgments. Second, the focus of this 
article is on blame generally, not just on verdicts; it is on the basic social–
psychological question of how blaming processes work, both in court and out of 
court, and both within the law and in everyday social life. To that end, rather 
than examining the influence of a person’s prior criminal record, as previous 
scholars have done, I instead examine the influence of subtle cues about 
character, such as whether someone works hard or goofs off on the job. 
In addition to testing a more expansive notion of moral character, a second 
goal of this article is to explore the extent to which the influence of moral 
character varies with the actor’s mental state. For example, is a negligent actor 
with a bad character blamed just as much as a reckless actor with a good 
character? Mental states, after all, are often difficult to know with precision. A 
 
 4. This relationship appears to be strongest when the defendant’s prior crimes were serious in 
nature or similar to the current accusation. See Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior-
Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 69 (1995) (summarizing prior 
research indicating that evidence of prior convictions affects chances of conviction, especially if “the 
prior conviction was for an offense similar to the one jurors were deciding”); Valerie P. Hans & 
Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 
CRIM. L.Q. 235, 237–38 (1976) (discussing potential ways that revealing a defendant’s criminal record 
might alter a verdict); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s 
Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 753–55 (2000) (“The results 
clearly confirm that evidence of previous convictions can have a prejudicial effect, especially when 
there is a recent previous conviction for a similar offence.”); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On 
the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 42 (1985) (noting that disclosure of similar prior crime increases the 
likelihood of conviction more than disclosure of dissimilar prior crime).  
 5. The mechanism by which information that the defendant committed prior crimes increases the 
likelihood of conviction is still not entirely clear. It is likely that perceivers treat prior crimes as 
evidence of propensity to commit the current offense that operates within a specific category—the idea 
being, for example, “once a burglar, always a burglar.” Support for this idea has emerged from several 
experiments, which demonstrate that mock jurors are more likely to convict when the defendant’s prior 
crimes are similar to the current offense, compared to when the prior crimes are dissimilar to the 
current offense. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 4, at 43 (“[T]he highest conviction rate occurred 
when the prior conviction was the same as the present charge.”). It is also possible that the positive 
correlation between prior crimes and likelihood of conviction is partially accounted for by credibility 
concerns—a testifying defendant who is impeached with evidence that he committed prior crimes 
involving deceit may be more likely to be convicted. Additionally, part of the variance might be 
accounted for by jurors’ inferences about the defendant’s dangerousness, which is arguably another 
version of the propensity thesis, in which the propensity inference is made across the broad category of 
violent acts. The important point here, however, is that none of these explanations for the association 
between prior crime and likelihood of conviction is focused on the broad idea of moral character, which 
is the focus of this article.  
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driver who kills a small child after he runs a stop sign while he is dialing his cell 
phone is reckless6 if he is conscious of and disregards the risk that someone 
might die; he is negligent7 if he was merely careless without consciously 
disregarding this risk.8 But it is difficult to glean another person’s mental state 
with such precision. If we think the driver might have been aware of the risk of 
death, knowing that the driver is a person of poor moral character might be 
enough to push us toward a more severe blame judgment. Conversely, knowing 
the driver is an otherwise virtuous person might pull us in the other direction, 
toward less severe blame. In this way, moral character might serve as a kind of 
proxy for mental state, so that a person with a bad character is blamed as if he 
were reckless, whereas a person with a good character is blamed as if he were 
not reckless. The experiment reported here tests this idea. 
A third focus of this article is moral emotion as the mechanism through 
which moral character influences blame.9 When we observe a moral violation, 
we often react emotionally. When we hear about a thug who snatches a purse 
from a vulnerable elderly victim, we feel angry. When we hear about the trauma 
experienced by a sexual assault survivor, we feel sympathy. When we learn 
about the sadistic murder of a child, we feel disgust. Experiencing moral 
emotions can cause us to make harsher moral judgments.10 The experiment 
reported in this article seeks first to establish the link between perceiving 
someone’s moral character and experiencing emotion. Specifically, the 
experiment tests the idea that, compared to an otherwise virtuous person who 
causes harm, an otherwise bad person who causes harm makes us feel angrier 
and more disgusted, which in turn leads to more punitive attributions of blame. 
These emotion-charged blame judgments have potentially important 
implications for basic social–psychological mechanisms involving blame, and 
 
 6. I am assuming, for the sake of this example, recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code 
(MPC). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). 
 7. See id. 
 8. This example appears in Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 597, 600 (2001). Ferzan explores the problematic space in between recklessness and 
negligence. Using the current example, suppose we can infer only that the driver recognized, on a very 
general level, that driving while dialing a cell phone is a dangerous thing to do, but nothing more. This 
state of mind—dubbed “opaque recklessness” by Ferzan—does not, strictly speaking, meet the MPC 
definition of recklessness because the driver did not consider and disregard the risk of death. According 
to the hypothesis discussed in the text herein, the opaquely reckless driver would be blamed, in part, 
according to available information about his moral character. In fact, moral character information 
might have an especially strong inference when mental state is ambiguous or is located in the liminal 
space between two culpability categories, as arguably is the case with opaque recklessness.  
 9. Moral emotions can be thought of as those emotions that are evoked by a threat to or violation 
of a personally valued moral principle. See C. Daniel Batson, What’s Wrong with Morality?, 3 EMOTION 
REV. 230, 233 (2011).  
 10. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, 
and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 
570 (1998) (noting that participants that were anger-primed made more punitive attributions than other 
participants); Thalia Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More 
Severe, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 780, 780 (2005) (“[M]oral judgments can be made more severe by the 
presence of a flash of disgust.”). 
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can inform our understanding of blame both within the legal system and outside 
of it in everyday social life. This process of inculpation, infused with emotion 
and driven by character inferences, can help to explain the charging decisions of 
prosecutors, the claiming decisions of injured people, the settlement behavior of 
litigants, and the punitive damages decisions of juries, among many other 
examples. 
Prior empirical research on the influence of prior conviction on legal 
judgments of guilt has focused on the “whodunit” question: Given the 
defendant’s prior record and other evidence presented, what is the probability 
that he committed the offense in the instant case? By contrast, the focus of the 
study presented in this article is quite different: Given that the actor 
undisputedly performed a specific act causing a particular result, with a 
specifically described mental state, what is the marginal influence, if any, of the 
actor’s moral character on observers’ judgments of blame? Whereas earlier 
empirical work on prior conviction focused on the probability that the 
defendant committed the offense, the current study focuses on character-driven, 
emotionally-infused blame judgments, given that the actor did cause the posited 
harm. The results of the current study suggest that perceptions of moral 
character and resulting moral emotions not only drive blame judgments but also 
the putatively fixed judgments of causation and intent as well. 
II 
MORAL CHARACTER AND BLAME 
Consider the following scenario11: John was speeding to get home, driving 40 
miles per hour in a 30-miles-per-hour zone. He came to an intersection and 
applied the brakes but was unable to stop in time because of an oil spill on the 
road.12 John hit another car in the intersection, injuring the other driver. John 
was speeding home in order to: 
 
(a) Hide from his parents an anniversary present for them that he had left 
out in the open, 
OR 
(b) Hide from his parents a vial of cocaine that he had left out in the open. 
 
When people think about this scenario, those who learn that John was 
hiding cocaine think that he was more responsible for the accident, on average, 
than those who learn that John was hiding a present.13 From the perspective of 
legal responsibility, this is an odd result, given that John’s behavior, the other 
 
 11. This scenario and results described herein are reported in Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 369 (1992). 
 12. Alternatively, the stop sign was obscured by a large tree branch. Id. The pattern of results 
described below is the same in the oil and tree branch variations. Id. at 370. 
 13. Id. at 370. 
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driver’s behavior, and the accident scene are the same in each scenario. John’s 
state of mind, of course, was different—in the sense that the object that he sped 
home to hide was different. But comparing the two scenarios, John’s state of 
mind was not different in any legally relevant way. If John is liable for the 
accident, it is because he was negligent—he should have foreseen that his 
speeding caused a risk of harm. The foreseeability of the harm is the same in 
each scenario, as is John’s failure to exercise reasonable care. 
Besides differences in responsibility judgments, there is another oddity that 
emerges in reactions to this story. Not only do people think John is more 
responsible, but they also think he is more of the cause of the accident when the 
object he was thinking about hiding was cocaine, rather than a present.14 From 
the perspective of legal causation, this also presents something of a puzzle. The 
chain of events between the accident and the injury is exactly the same in each 
scenario. The risk of colliding and injuring another person does not differ from 
one scenario to the next, and neither does John’s breach of the standard of due 
care. What does differ, however, is John’s motivation for engaging in the act 
that led to the collision. In the scenario involving the cocaine, John’s motivation 
for speeding was nefarious; in the scenario involving the present, John’s 
motivation for speeding was laudable (despite the fact that it does not outweigh 
the foreseeable risk of injury). 
In light of the drug-related nature of John’s nefarious goal in the cocaine 
scenario, one might object that, in fact, people might have imagined his conduct 
to be different from the anniversary present scenario. Perhaps people thought 
that John was under the influence of cocaine at the very moment of the 
collision, thus making him more responsible. Or, perhaps John’s goal of hiding 
cocaine was more distracting than the goal of hiding a present, so that in the 
cocaine scenario people interpret John as having paid less attention. Or, 
perhaps in the cocaine scenario people imagined John driving faster than in the 
anniversary present scenario—even though the speed was specified to be the 
same in both versions—so that John seemed more responsible and his actions 
more causal for those reasons. 
There is further evidence, however, supporting the hypothesis that an 
actor’s bad motive can result in harsher judgments of blame and causation for 
harm. In previous work,15 we presented people with a scenario involving a 
man—Sam—who stored oxygen tanks in his backyard shed. When a cigarette 
butt landed near the shed, the tanks accidentally exploded and a neighborhood 
youth was killed. Just as blame and causation judgments were harsher for John 
the driver when he had a bad motive for speeding, judgments of blame and 
 
 14. Id.  
 15. Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2; see also Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional 
Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 
3, 11–13 (1999) (demonstrating that when an investor was motivated by malicious greed, perceivers 
were more likely to positively assess arguments supporting liability for libel, compared to when he was 
motivated by honest concern).  
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causation in this study were harsher for Sam when he had a bad motive for 
storing oxygen tanks in his shed. Specifically, if Sam stored oxygen because he 
was a high school football coach who cheated by giving oxygen to his players, he 
was judged to be more responsible, more blameworthy, and his role more 
causal in the accidental death of the youth compared to if he stored oxygen to 
care for his sick daughter.16 
In the oxygen study, it is implausible that participants perceived that there 
was any greater danger or risk of oxygen explosion in the football scenario than 
in the sick daughter scenario. Rather, it must have been Sam’s bad motive that 
prompted people to perceive him as more blameworthy, responsible, and causal 
in the football scenario. Perhaps, however, these differences in blame and 
perception of causation are not so anomalous from a legal perspective. After 
all, the social value of the conduct of storing oxygen tanks to care for a sick 
child is greater than that of cheating at football. And the social value of 
speeding home to surprise loved ones with a gift is greater than that of hiding 
illegal drugs. When the social value of conduct is sufficiently great, this can 
justify the risk that is assumed by the actor. In tort law, a reasonable person 
considers the risk of harm in light of the utility of the conduct.17 Thus, a vaccine 
that carries a risk of harming 1 in 1000 children might be considered reasonable 
given the social value of the vaccine; a piece of candy that carries the same risk 
of harm would not. 
Like tort law, criminal law takes into account the extent to which the actor’s 
risky behavior was justified when assigning liability for crimes involving 
recklessness. The Model Penal Code test focuses on “the nature and purpose” 
of the actor’s conduct and its surrounding circumstances.18 Depending on the 
nature and purpose of the conduct, the actor’s disregard of the associated risk 
might be considered consistent with the standards of a law-abiding person, on 
the one hand, or a gross deviation from those standards, on the other. In the 
latter case, the actor would be deemed to have acted with a reckless state of 
mind. For example, a surgeon who disregards a substantial risk of death to the 
patient in performing a dangerous operation might be justified in doing so if the 
purpose of the conduct is to save the patient’s life, and there is no safer way to 
do so. On the other hand, if the purpose of the conduct is something other than 
saving the patient’s life (for example, testing a new surgical technique), it is 
unlikely that the risk of harm would be justified. 
In light of the legal standards for risky conduct in tort law and criminal law, 
it is perhaps not so anomalous that in the two studies described, people would 
consider John the cocaine hider more blameworthy than John the present hider, 
 
 16. In a third neutral condition, the man stored oxygen for delivery as part of his home health care 
business. In this scenario, judgments of blame and causation were roughly midway between those in the 
football cheating scenario on the one hand, and the sick daughter scenario on the other. Nadler & 
McDonnell, supra note 2. 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); see also United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  
 18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). 
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and Sam the football cheater to be more blameworthy than Sam the father of 
the sick child. Putting to the side the issue of blameworthiness, it is perhaps still 
puzzling why people would see an actor with a bad motive more causal in the 
chain of events leading to harm. As a general matter, there is evidence that 
causal proximity influences blame judgments.19 Thus, harm that occurs by 
touching or other personal contact with the victim is judged to be less morally 
permissible than the same harm that occurs without personal contact.20 But in 
the cocaine–present study, and in the oxygen tank study, causal proximity does 
not seem to vary between the good motive and bad motive scenarios. To the 
contrary, in both versions of the scenario in both studies, there is really no 
question about the extent to which the actor caused the harm. In the cocaine–
present study, John failed to stop his car at the stop sign and collided with 
another car. To be sure, there were other causal factors contributing to the 
accident.21 But under any plausible account of causal explanation for the harm, 
John’s conduct was a primary cause of the harm, and the proximity of his 
actions to the harm was the same in each version of the scenario. Similarly, in 
the oxygen tank study, Sam’s conduct was a primary cause of the harm, and the 
proximity of his actions to the harm was the same in each version of the 
scenario. In both studies, therefore, there seems to be no obvious, 
straightforward explanation as to why having a bad motive would transform 
conduct into a stronger cause of harm. 
Mark Alicke’s theory of culpable control represents one attempt to explain 
this puzzle. The theory posits that when people assess blame, they try to gauge 
the extent to which the actor exercised control over the outcome.22 If an actor 
acts intentionally and that action directly causes the outcome, then the actor is 
perceived to have high control; conversely, if there is an absence of intent and 
there was a long chain of events that caused the outcome, then the actor is 
perceived to have low control. How much intent did the actor have? How 
strongly causal was the actor’s role in the harm? It is well understood that these 
judgments often are made under uncertainty.23 Alicke argues that perceptions of 
intent and harm are directly influenced by our initial affective reaction to the 
harm situation.24 Once strong negative reactions are evoked by harmful 
 
 19. See Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: 
Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1086 (2006) (“Subjects rated . . . harm 
involving physical contact as morally worse than harm without contact.”).  
 20. See id.; Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2105–06 (2001) (noting that most people find pushing a stranger off a 
bridge to be more troubling than flipping a switch causing a runaway trolley to hit a stranger, even 
though both actions resulted in five lives being saved).  
 21. In one version of the scenario the road was slippery because of a prior oil spill; in another 
version, the stop sign was partially obscured by a tree branch. There were no notable differences in the 
results between these two versions of the scenario.  
 22.  Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 557 
(2000).  
 23. See Alicke, supra note 11, at 368. 
 24. Alicke, supra note 22, at 558. 
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conduct, then people’s desire to blame kicks into gear, and their assessment of 
factors like foreseeability, intent, and causation is colored by their motivation to 
understand the conduct as highly blameworthy.25 On this account, people blame 
early, then justify the blame assessment by pointing to corresponding levels of 
foreseeability, intent, and causation. Thus, John the cocaine hider evoked a 
strong negative reaction, leading to perceptions of high blameworthiness for the 
accident and injury, and correspondingly high perceptions of causation to justify 
the blame attribution after the fact. John the present hider evoked a reaction 
that was less strongly negative, so less extreme judgments of blame and 
causation followed. Similarly, on this account, Sam the football cheater evoked 
a strong negative reaction, leading to perceptions of high blameworthiness for 
the youth’s death, and correspondingly high perceptions of causation to justify 
the blame attribution; the reactions to Sam the father of the sick daughter were 
less negative. On this account we engage in “blame validation”: We make blame 
attributions spontaneously according to how strongly negative our gut reaction 
is then we validate our blame assessment by tuning evaluations of causation and 
intention accordingly. 
Alicke’s blame-validation model posits that we have an immediate negative 
reaction to an actor with a bad motive who caused harm, which leads to a fast, 
automatic initial blame judgment.26 This initial blame judgment then guides 
subsequent perceptions about the actor’s causal role in producing the harm. 
The extent to which this type of blame-early account accurately describes moral 
decisionmaking is a matter of dispute among social psychologists and 
experimental philosophers.27 Alicke’s model is a version of a blame-early model. 
By contrast, the blame-late models posit that once a perceiver detects a harmful 
event, she assesses causation and mental state before coming to a conclusion 
about blame.28 More research will be required in the future to sort out the 
causal order of blame and related attributions. Regardless of whether blame in 
fact comes early or late, there remains strong evidence that an actor’s bad 
motive for acting (for example, hiding drugs, cheating at football) can influence 
 
 25. The study of motivated cognition in law has received increased attention in recent years. See, 
e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance 
Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive 
Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755706; Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); 
Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Punishment Goals: Legal 
Implications of Outcome-Driven Reasoning, 100 CA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1641022.  
 26. Alicke, supra note 22, at 558. 
 27. Compare Alicke, supra note 22, and Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: 
A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001), with Fiery 
Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral 
Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353 (2008), and Bertram F. Malle et al., Moral, Cognitive, and Social: The 
Nature of Blame, in SOCIAL THINKING AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2012).  
 28. Malle et al., supra note 27. 
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perceptions of causation. 
We have seen that bad motives can increase attributions of blame and 
causation. We have also seen that law takes into account motive as sometimes 
relevant to whether an actor is justified in disregarding a risk of harm. 
Therefore, at least with regard to blame, the law takes account of people’s 
natural inclination to blame according to the actor’s motive, even if the motive–
causation connection is not explicitly accounted for in law. But reason for acting 
is only one example of how people’s initial evaluation of an actor might push 
them toward harsh judgments of blame or pull them toward lenient judgments. 
There are many other variables that enter into the blame equation. Some 
variables are more familiar, such as the severity of the harm, or the actor’s 
intent. But other potential antecedents of blame are considered more 
problematic, at least by some theorists. On the one hand, it is well settled that 
an actor’s race, for example, or nationality, or religion should not influence our 
perceptions of blame for harm caused by that actor.29 On the other hand, law 
sometimes permits consideration of an actor’s motive.30 In this vein, consider 
another characteristic: the actor’s moral character. The fact that John the 
cocaine hider was perceived as more blameworthy and causal than John the 
present hider might have been as much a function of John being derogated as a 
drug user as John’s motives being derogated as illegitimate. Thus, an actor’s bad 
motive might simply establish that the subsequent harm was not justified by the 
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct, as the law explicitly recognizes. 
Alternatively, an actor’s bad motive might serve as a proxy for that actor’s bad 
moral character, which is derogated and leads perceivers to blame more 
harshly. 
There is evidence for the proposition that our perception of a person’s 
motive is important for our understanding of that person’s moral character. For 
example, a soccer player who intentionally spikes a player on the opposing team 
is seen as being less moral as a person when his motive was for personal gain 
(trying to win the game) than when his motive was reactionary (retaliation for 
being recently bumped and taunted by the other player).31 Similarly, a person 
who administers an electric shock to another person for monetary gain is rated 
less moral than a person who shocks another person to avoid being shocked 
himself.32 The influence of motive on perceptions of moral character can 
sometimes be dramatic, transforming an outlaw into a hero, or at least an anti-
villain. Consider, for example, the television character named Omar Little on 
the HBO series The Wire. Omar robs and kills drug dealers for a living, but at 
the same time upholds his own moral code, which entails not harming law-
abiding citizens, and no thuggery on Sundays. Because there is a kind of purity 
 
 29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2006). 
 30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 31. Glenn D. Reeder et al., Inferences About the Morality of an Aggressor: The Role of Perceived 
Motive, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 789, 792–94 (2002). 
 32. Id. at 794–95. 
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in his motives, Omar garners more moral admiration than condemnation. 
Motive, therefore, can make or break perceptions of moral character. 
In everyday social life, sorting the “bad guys” from the “good guys” plays an 
important social function. When we encounter a new person, we immediately 
size up her “perceived intent”—traits like friendliness, trustworthiness, and 
helpfulness signal whether the other is a friend or foe.33 We make these 
judgments remarkably quickly. In one study, for example, when a photo of a 
face was flashed for a fraction of a second, people were most reliable at judging 
trustworthiness, compared to other traits like competence and likeability.34 We 
are especially keen to size other people up first on moral traits, and only later 
on non-moral traits (such as competence and intelligence), perhaps because the 
friend-or-foe question is an especially important one when encountering a 
stranger.35 
The primacy of moral character judgments suggests that these concerns 
might infuse the process of blaming. That is, when we are deciding the extent to 
which to blame an actor who has caused harm, we might be implicitly asking 
ourselves, “To what extent is this actor a bad person?” rather than (or perhaps 
in addition to), “To what extent is this particular action wrong?”36 Because 
blaming might be focused to a large extent on perceptions of the actor’s moral 
character, then anything that influences our perceptions of the actor’s moral 
character is likely to influence our judgments of blame for harm. Character 
perceptions might be gleaned from the act itself. For example, consider a large 
man walking down a narrow hallway who bumps a passerby with his shoulder, 
and then calls the passerby a derogatory name. Those actions, in themselves, 
are likely to trigger negative perceptions of the actor’s moral character. If blame 
judgments derive primarily from character judgments, then the blame process is 
relatively simple: only a bad person would do such a thing, so this actor is to 
blame. If blame judgments are constructed by assessing various factors 
surrounding the act, then the process is quite different: we examine the extent 
to which the harm was intentional, the extent to which the actor caused it, and 
the severity of the harm, and then decide whether the act was wrong, and finally 
whether the actor had any excuse or justification. The latter process can be 
 
 33. See Susan T. Fiske et al., Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence, 
11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 77, 77 (2007) (describing the fundamental nature of the two dimensions of 
warmth and competence in social cognition). 
 34. Janine Willis & Alexander Todorov, First Impressions: Making Up Your Mind After a 100-Ms 
Exposure to a Face, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 592, 594 (2006). 
 35. See id.; Bogdan Wojciszke et al., On the Dominance of Moral Categories in Impression 
Formation, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1251, 1254–55 (1998) (finding that subjects 
found moral traits to be more important than competence traits when forming impressions of 
strangers). 
 36. See David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, Bringing Character Back: How the Motivation to 
Evaluate Character Influences Judgments of Moral Blame, in The SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
MORALITY: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL 97 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver 
eds., 2011) (“[P]roposing a person-based character approach as an alternative to the act-based 
theories.”).  
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thought of as act-based blaming, as opposed to character-based blaming. The 
result may be the same (at least in some cases), but the focus is quite different. 
The main point to note here is that act-based blaming does not consider the 
actor’s moral character. 
The study of John the driver suggests that we do, in fact, engage in 
character-based blaming, at least insofar as information about John’s motive for 
speeding (hiding cocaine or hiding a present) informs our perception of John’s 
moral character. The case of Sam—the man who stored the oxygen tanks in his 
shed—illustrates even more clearly that we engage in character-based blaming. 
In our experiment, not only did we find that people blame Sam more harshly 
when his motive was cheating rather than caretaking, but we also found that 
Sam’s motive influenced perceptions of Sam’s moral character: Sam who stored 
oxygen to cheat was judged to have less of a moral character, be less 
trustworthy, and be more of a bad person than Sam who stored oxygen to take 
care of his sick daughter.37 Thus, to judge moral character people sometimes use 
information derived from the act itself (as in the shoulder bump example), and 
they sometimes use information derived from the motive for the act (as in John 
the driver and Sam the oxygen storer). In either case, to the extent that the 
blaming process focuses on the actor rather than the act, inferences about 
character will inform perceptions of blame, no matter how they were derived. 
In this article, I expand the inquiry begun earlier regarding the relationship 
between moral character and blame. Specifically, I investigate the extent to 
which information about moral character influences blame even when that 
moral character information is independent from the harmful act. For example, 
if Joe kills a man in a bar fight, do we blame him less if we also learn that Joe 
spends his free time as a volunteer tutor for underprivileged youth? Conversely, 
do we blame him more if we learn that Joe is a greedy miser who refuses to help 
support his elderly mother? There is already some evidence that suggests that 
independent information about moral character can influence blame 
judgments.38 In one study, participants read a story about Jack, who argued with 
and then pushed another man. The man slipped and suffered serious injuries. 
Jack was presented as someone who helped a stranded motorist, gave extra 
time off to a worker, and volunteered at a homeless shelter, or alternatively, as 
someone who drove by the motorist, denied the time off to the worker, and 
made an excuse to not volunteer at the homeless shelter. People rated “bad 
Jack” as more to blame for the victim’s injuries than “good Jack.” 
I sought to replicate and extend this finding. First, in the experiment 
reported in this article, I focused on the influence of independent evidence of 
character on judgments of blame when the severity of the harm is extreme—
that is, death. It is possible that when the resulting harm is grave, the impulse to 
blame becomes so strong that it overwhelms any potential influence of 
 
 37. Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 2. 
 38. Mark D. Alicke, Evidential and Extra-Evidential Evaluations of Social Conduct, 9 J. SOC. 
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 591, 595–601 (1994).  
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independent information about moral character. The plausibility of this 
hypothesis is supported by numerous experimental studies that consistently find 
that actors are blamed more harshly for severe harm than for mild harm, even 
when other circumstances are held constant.39 
An alternative, competing hypothesis is that independent information about 
moral character influences blame judgments even for severe outcomes such as 
death. This hypothesis is supported by the results of the study involving Sam, 
who was found more blameworthy for an accidental death when his motive for 
storing the oxygen was bad than when it was good. In that study, bad motive led 
to perceptions of bad moral character, which led to increased blaming. By 
contrast, in the experiment reported here, moral character is derived not from 
motive, but from information largely independent of reasons for acting. 
According to this competing hypothesis, information about moral character will 
influence judgments of blame for a severe outcome regardless of whether the 
moral character inference derives from the actor’s motive or from an 
independent source. 
The second aim of the experiment reported in this article was to examine 
variations in the actor’s state of mind, to ascertain whether the influence of 
moral character information varies according to the actor’s level of awareness 
of the risk of harm (for example, reckless versus negligent). It is well established 
empirically that blame judgments generally increase with increasingly culpable 
states of mind,40 so that an actor who causes harm recklessly, for example, is 
perceived as more blameworthy than one who causes harm negligently.41 The 
joint influence of bad moral character and culpable mental state might be 
additive. It might be the case, for example, that a negligent actor with a bad 
moral character is blamed just as harshly as a reckless actor—in this sense, 
moral character becomes a kind of proxy for a more culpable mens rea. In 
addition, a reckless actor with good moral character might receive more lenient 
treatment in terms of perceptions of blameworthiness, and be blamed only as 
much as a negligent actor. The experiment reported here tests these 
possibilities. 
A related hypothesis regarding moral character and mental state is that 
people’s perceptions of mental state themselves are influenced by the actor’s 
moral character. For example, people might perceive an act as intentional 
precisely because it was performed by an actor with a bad moral character, 
 
 39. For a review, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of “Responsibility”: 
A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000) (demonstrating that people 
attribute greater responsibility for a harm when the harm is severe than when the harm is minor). 
 40. That intentionally doing something bad is worse than doing it unintentionally is understood by 
children, see John M. Darley et al., Intentions and Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of Children 
and Adults, 49 CHILD DEV. 66, 67–68 (1978), as well as by adults, see John M. Darley et al., Doing 
Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010); Lawrence M. Solan & John 
M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 265 (Autumn 2001).  
 41. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011). 
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whereas that same act might be perceived as merely reckless if the actor’s 
character is good (or if character information is absent). After all, mental state 
is rarely if ever completely knowable. In making the uncertain determination 
about mental state, people might use information about character to fill in the 
blanks.42 As Pizarro and Tannenbaum put it, “Bad people, by definition, are 
likely to desire and intend bad things.”43 The epistemic elusiveness of the mental 
states of others suggests the possibility that our judgments about those mental 
states are vulnerable to a variety of influences. Experimental philosopher 
Joshua Knobe argues that intentionality judgments are more than just factual 
descriptions of others’ mental states—they are also normative judgments about 
praise and blame.44 Experimental evidence supports this view, and suggests that 
moral judgments about an act and its outcome can affect perceptions about the 
extent to which that act was performed intentionally. For example, people are 
more likely to say that a company executive intentionally caused an outcome if 
the outcome was negative (harming the environment) than if the outcome was 
positive (helping the environment).45 This is true despite the fact that in both 
versions of the vignette, the executive said that he did not care about harming 
or helping the environment, he only cared about making a profit. This suggests 
that people perceive the executive who caused the negative outcome as a bad 
person who must be punished, and in an effort to justify that punishment, they 
interpret his act as intentional.46 The possibility that intentionality judgments 
are infused with moral judgments suggests that the moral character of the actor 
influences judgments of intentionality. Unlike Knobe’s intentionality studies, 
we vary the moral character of the actor, rather than the valence of the 
outcome. 
Finally, in this study we investigate the influence of emotion on blame. 
Moral violations provoke emotional reactions in observers.47 For example, when 
considering the moral quandary regarding whether one ought to push a large 
stranger off a footbridge to his death in order to save five people from a 
runaway trolley, people become very emotionally engaged at the thought of 
pushing someone to their death.48 By comparison, people are less emotionally 
engaged at the thought of flipping a switch to redirect a runaway trolley to save 
five people, even though, as before, one person will be killed as a result.49 
Depending on the features of the situation, thinking about harm can engage a 
 
 42. See Pizarro & Tannenbaum, supra note 36, at 11–12 (“For instance, if there is evidence that an 
individual is a bad person, the inference that he or she intended a negative outcome seems 
reasonable.”). 
 43. Id. at 12. 
 44. See Joshua Knobe, Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 315, 317–
19 (2010). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Greene et al., supra note 20. 
 48. Id. at 2106. 
 49. Id. 
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variety of emotionally laden processes. 
Witnessing behavior that poses a threat to the integrity of the social order 
typically triggers contempt, anger, disgust, or some combination of these.50 
These moral emotions are associated with disapproval of others’ behavior, and 
they arise spontaneously upon observing an actor causing harm. The experience 
of contempt, anger, or disgust triggers the response tendency to blame and 
punish.51 In fact, when blame and punishment goals are frustrated, “moral 
spillovers” can occur in which observers who learn about an unpunished 
transgressor become more punitive toward unrelated acts of harm,52 or even 
engage in deviant behavior themselves.53 Thus, another aim of this study is to 
demonstrate that a harmful outcome caused by an actor with a bad moral 
character provokes in observers negative emotional reactions in the form of 
anger, contempt, and disgust, which then lead to an increased tendency to 
blame and punish. 
In the experiment that follows, I investigated the extent to which moral 
character, apart from motive or reasons for acting, influences judgments of 
blame, intent, causation, emotion, and punishment. To accomplish this, I varied 
two factors: the moral character of the actor (good or bad) and the mental state 
of the actor (aware or not aware of the risk of harm). 
III 
EXPERIMENT: THE EFFECT OF RECKLESSNESS AND CHARACTER ON MORAL 
EMOTION AND BLAME 
The experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that bad moral 
character influences perceptions of blame, and that this influence increases as 
mens rea weakens. A group of adults volunteered to participate in an online 
questionnaire that varied both the moral character of the wrongdoer and the 
wrongdoer’s mental state. The case is loosely based upon People v. Hall,54 a 
Colorado Supreme Court case that held that a skier who causes death can be 
 
 50. See Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions 
(Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 575 (1999) (arguing that contempt, anger, and disgust are related 
“emotional reactions to the moral violations of others”). 
 51. See Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law, (Univ. of 
Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 346, 2007) (examining the relationship between indignation 
and the response tendency to punish the guilty actor), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1002707; 
Lerner et al., supra note 10, at 570 (noting the role that anger plays in justice judgments). 
 52. See Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor, 29 
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 787–89 (1999) (examining the relationship between anger over injustice 
and determinations of who deserves punishment). 
 53. See Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations on 
Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239, 1243 (2008) (finding that observing 
outcomes that violate strongly held moral beliefs can lead to engaging in deviant behavior); Janice 
Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1440 (2005) (arguing that perceptions of injustice in 
the law can sometimes lead people to display a greater willingness to disregard the law). 
 54. 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000). 
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tried for reckless manslaughter. Some of the facts of the actual Hall case were 
retained, but fictional details were added to permit variation of moral character 
and mental state. 
A. Participants 
A total of 201 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk web service, which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population 
of online users. Participants were paid $1.50 for completing the survey, which 
took about five minutes. Participants were assured that their responses would 
remain anonymous and that identifying information would not be collected. 
Seven participants were excluded because they failed to correctly respond to an 
instructional manipulation check,55 leaving a sample size of 194 participants. Of 
these, 83% identified as White, 4% as Black, 2% as Hispanic, 6% as Asian 
Pacific, 4% as South Asian, 1% as Middle Eastern, and 1% as other. Sixty-
seven percent were college educated. The mean age was about 41 years. 
Women comprised 61% of the sample.56 
B. Design and Materials 
Participants were randomly divided and placed into one of four groups 
based on the two independent variables. The first variable, moral character, had 
two levels: good or bad. The second variable, recklessness, also had two levels: 
low or high. The variables were incorporated into the vignette that follows. The 
experimental design was two by two between subjects, so that each participant 
saw only one of the four versions of the vignette, reproduced below. 
Nathan is a 24 year old man who works as a ski lift operator on Vail Mountain in 
Colorado. He is an experienced skier and was a member of his high school skiing 
team. 
[Good Character]: Nathan is considered a model employee. He always arrives on time 
for his shift, and works hard. His supervisor considers him responsible and reliable. 
From May through September, when the ski slopes are closed, Nathan spends his time 
volunteering at a local animal shelter, as well as helping his family run their small 
business. 
[Bad Character]: Nathan is not considered a good employee. He often arrives late for 
his shift, and is sometimes caught absent from his post. His supervisor considers him 
irresponsible and unreliable. From May through September, when the ski slopes are 
closed, Nathan spends his time loafing around town and watching TV. His family has a 
small business but he rarely helps them out with their work. 
 
 55. See Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to 
Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) (describing instructional 
manipulation checks as a question embedded within the experiment requiring the participant to 
confirm reading the instruction). In our experiment, we asked, “According to the story, Nathan spent 
most of his free time doing what?” and asked respondents to choose one of four options: Watching 
television, Volunteering, Reading, or None of the above. 
 56. Although we did not collect additional demographic information in this particular experiment, 
similar recent experiments conducted by the author drawing from the same Mechanical Turk 
population yielded samples that were: 95% U.S. residents for at least the past 12 years, 56% with a 
household income of less than $50,000 per year, 48% liberal or very liberal, 28% moderate, and 25% 
conservative or very conservative. 
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One day in April, after finishing his shift, Nathan left his post at the top of the 
mountain and headed down the hill. He was skiing very fast, ski tips in the air, his 
weight back on his skis and his arms out to his sides. It was late in the day, and there 
were only a few skiers on the slope. 
[Low Recklessness]: Nathan felt confident that he could avoid anyone in his path, but 
then he lost control. 
[High Recklessness]: Nathan was feeling reckless that day, and he knew there was a 
risk he might hit someone but he didn’t care, and then he lost control. 
He was skiing out of control for some time when he took flight off of a knoll, and was 
unable to stop when he saw people on the slope below him. Nathan’s ski collided with 
the head of one of those people, Alan. 
Unfortunately, Alan suffered a severe brain injury and died a few days later. A test of 
Nathan’s blood determined that there were no drugs or alcohol in Nathan’s system at 
the time of the accident. 
Each participant read only one version of the vignette.57 After reading the 
vignette, participants were asked to provide their own personal opinion about 
Nathan and his role in the death of Alan: to what extent he is responsible; how 
negatively he should be judged; how much he is to blame; to what extent he 
caused the death; how intentional were his actions; and how foreseeable was 
death from Nathan’s perspective. All questions were measured on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of presentation of these 
questions was random. 
As a check on the character manipulation, participants rated three items 
that were presented in random order: Nathan’s good moral character (1=not at 
all; 7=very much), Nathan’s trustworthiness (1=not at all; 7=very much), and the 
extent to which Nathan is a good person (1=bad person; 7=good person). As a 
check on the recklessness manipulation, participants rated two items presented 
in random order: the extent to which Nathan believed he could kill someone 
because of the way he was skiing (1=not at all; 7=very much), and the extent to 
which Nathan believed he could injure someone because of the way he was 
skiing (1=not at all; 7=very much). 
To gauge participants’ emotions experienced as a result of reading the story, 
we first asked them how angry they were feeling right now (1=not at all angry; 
7=very angry) and how upsetting the story was (1=not at all upsetting; 7=very 
upsetting). Participants were then asked “When you think about Nathan, to 
what extent do you feel . . .?” Following this question stem, participants rated 
separately the extent to which they felt disgust, contempt, and compassion 
(1=not at all; 7=very much). 
Finally, participants assessed deserved punishment by indicating how 
severely Nathan should be punished for the death of Alan (1=not at all; 7=very 
severely), and what kind of prison term should Nathan receive for killing Alan 
(1=no prison at all; 4=average imprisonment; 7=life imprisonment). 
 
 57. The four versions of the vignette were good moral character / low recklessness; good moral 
character / high recklessness; bad moral character / low recklessness; bad moral character / high 
recklessness. Each participant read only one of these four versions. 
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C. Results58 
1. Manipulation Checks 
Judgments of Nathan’s moral character, trustworthiness, and goodness were 
highly correlated,59 and were combined into a single measure of perceived 
overall moral character consisting of the mean of these ratings. As predicted, 
perceptions of Nathan’s overall moral character depended on whether he was 
described as a responsible worker, volunteer, and son (good Nathan) or an 
irresponsible worker and son (bad Nathan).60 This provides evidence that 
perceived moral character was successfully manipulated. 
The vignette also varied according to Nathan’s awareness of the risk of 
harm. Judgments of the extent to which Nathan believed he might kill and 
believed he might injure someone because of the way he was skiing were highly 
correlated,61 and were combined into a single measure of awareness of risk 
consisting of the mean of these judgments. As predicted, perceptions of 
Nathan’s awareness of risk depended on whether he was described as being 
aware or not aware of the risk of injury or death.62 This provides evidence that 
the extent to which Nathan was judged to be aware of the risk of causing injury 
or death was successfully manipulated. 
2. Responsibility Judgments 
 Did moral character and recklessness influence the extent to which Nathan 
was perceived as responsible, blameworthy, and judged negatively for the death 
of Alan? The three dependent measures were highly correlated, so they were 
combined into a single measure of Overall Responsibility.63 The means are 
illustrated in Figure 1. Nathan was perceived as having more overall 
responsibility for Alan’s death if his character was bad rather than good;64 
Nathan was also perceived as more responsible if he was aware of the possibility 
of death or injury, compared to if he was not aware.65 These two main effects 
 
 58. All analyses were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) unless otherwise noted. An 
analysis of variance measures for statistical differences between the means of groups whose data are 
categorical (as opposed to continuous). WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 376–81 (5th ed. 1994). 
Throughout the results section of this article, “significantly” refers to statistical significance, which 
denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis—the possibility of no differences between the various 
groups—at a probability level indicated by the p-value reported. Thus, “p” is defined as the probability 
of finding a difference or relationship between two groups as large as that observed if there were, in 
fact, no difference or relationship between them. Id. at 267–82.  
 59. Cronbach’s alpha = .95. Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of items, 
and ranges between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency. RICK H. HOYLE ET 
AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 83–84 (7th ed. 2002). 
 60. F(1, 193) = 331.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .634; Mean (Good Character) = 5.41; Mean (Bad Character) = 
2.69.  
 61. Cronbach’s alpha = .87. 
 62. F(1, 191) = 112.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .372; Mean (Aware) = 4.73; Mean (Not Aware) = 2.54. 
 63. Cronbach’s alpha = .91. 
 64. F(1, 193) = 33.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .123. 
 65. F(1, 193) = 45.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .166. 
NADLER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2012 9:35 PM 
No. 2 2012] BLAMING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 19 
were qualified by a significant interaction,66 depicted in Figure 1. Nathan’s 
overall responsibility depended on his moral character, but this difference was 
more prominent when mens rea was weak—that is, when Nathan was not aware 
of the risk of injury or death. Planned contrasts nevertheless confirmed that 
“bad Nathan” was perceived to be more overall responsible than “good 
Nathan,” both when Nathan’s mens rea was reckless67 and when it was not 
reckless.68 
 
Figure 1. Mean ratings of Nathan’s overall responsibility in the death of 
Alan, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much). 
 
3. Judgments of Causation 
Participants rated the extent to which Nathan caused the death of Alan. 
Nathan was judged to be a stronger cause of Alan’s death when he was aware of 
the risk before he acted, compared to when he was not aware.69 As depicted in 
 
 66. F(1, 193) = 7.58, p < .05, ηp2 = .017. 
 67. z = 2.57, p = .01. 
 68. z = 5.63, p < .001. 
 69. F(1, 193) = 13.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .066; Mean (Reckless) = 6.43; Mean (Not Reckless) = 5.76. We 
did not detect a statistically significant main effect of moral character on causation. F(1, 193) = 3.74, p = 
.127, ηp2 = .011. Mean (Good Character) = 5.97, Mean (Bad Character) = 6.23. Similarly, there was no 
significant interaction between character and recklessness on judgments of causation. F(1, 193) = 1.78, p 
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Figure 2, there was no character-driven difference in perceived causation when 
Nathan’s mens rea was reckless.70 The pattern of means depicted in Figure 2 
suggests that when Nathan was not aware of the risk of death or injury “bad 
Nathan” was perceived to be a stronger cause of Alan’s death than “good 
Nathan.” However, a planned contrast testing this difference did not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance.71 Therefore, it is unclear whether 
moral character played any role in perceptions of causation in this experiment, 
although the pattern of means suggests that the actions of “bad Nathan” might 
have been perceived as more causal than “good Nathan” when mens rea was 
not reckless. Further research will be required to investigate this relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Mean ratings of the extent to which Nathan caused the death of 
Alan, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much). 
 
4. Judgments of Intent 
Participants rated the extent to which Nathan acted intentionally in the 
 
< .29, ηp2 = .006. Planned contrasts reveal effects of character within each mens rea category, as detailed 
in the text. 
 70. A planned contrast shows no difference between good and bad character within the reckless 
mens rea group. z = 0.34, p = .74. 
 71. z = 1.83, p = .067. 
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death of Alan. When Nathan’s moral character was bad, he was judged to have 
acted more intentionally than when his moral character was good.72 In addition, 
and perhaps not surprisingly, when Nathan was aware of the risk of death or 
injury, he was judged to have acted more intentionally than when he acted 
without awareness.73 Planned contrasts indicate that when Nathan acted 
recklessly, “bad Nathan” was perceived to have acted more intentionally than 
“good Nathan.”74 Similarly, when Nathan acted without recklessness, “bad 
Nathan” was perceived as acting more intentionally than “good Nathan.”75 The 
intention judgment means are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of the extent to which Nathan acted intentionally 
toward the death of Alan, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 
7=very much). 
 
 72. F(1, 193) = 17.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .077; Mean (Good Character) = 1.51; Mean (Bad Character) = 
2.17. 
 73. F(1, 193) = 331.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .634; Mean (Good Character) = 1.46; Mean (Bad Character) = 
2.20. The interaction between character and recklessness was not statistically significant. F(1, 193) = 
1.43; p = .23. 
 74. z = 3.82, p < .001. 
 75. z = 2.13, p = .03. 
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5. Judgments of Foreseeability 
Finally, participants rated the extent to which Alan’s death was foreseeable 
from Nathan’s perspective. Not surprisingly, the death was judged to be more 
foreseeable when Nathan was described as being aware of the risk, compared to 
when he was not.76 More importantly, participants judged Alan’s death to be 
more foreseeable from “bad Nathan’s” perspective than from “good Nathan’s” 
perspective.77 Planned contrasts indicate that the character-driven difference 
just described emerges only when Nathan acted recklessly;78 when Nathan acted 
without recklessness, there was no reliable difference in foreseeability between 
“bad Nathan” and “good Nathan.”79 The foreseeability means are depicted in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Mean ratings of the extent to which Alan’s death was foreseeable 
from Nathan’s perspective, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 
7=very much). 
 
 
 76. F(1, 193) = 32.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .139; Mean (Reckless) = 3.62; Mean (Not Reckless) = 2.39.  
 77. F(1, 193) = 12.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .051; Mean (Good Character) = 2.65; Mean (Bad Character) = 
3.38. The character–reckless interaction did not reach statistical significance. F(1, 193) = 2.39, p = .12. 
 78. z = 3.54, p < .001. 
 79. z = 1.36, p < .174. 
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6. Punishment Judgments 
Judgments of how severely Nathan should be punished and of what length 
prison term he should receive were highly correlated,80 so they were combined 
into a single measure, in which a rating of “1” indicates no punishment and “7” 
indicates severe punishment. Participants judged Nathan as deserving more 
severe punishment when he acted with a reckless mental state compared to 
when he was not reckless.81 In addition, there was a main effect for character, 
such that “bad Nathan” was perceived to deserve more severe punishment than 
“good Nathan.”82 Planned contrasts confirmed that the increased punishment 
severity for “bad Nathan” (compared to “good Nathan”) proved statistically 
significant in both the reckless83 and not reckless conditions.84 
 
Figure 5. Mean ratings of punishment severity, by moral character and 
awareness (1=no punishment; 7=severe punishment). 
 
7. Moral Emotion 
Participants indicated how angry they were feeling, how upsetting the story 
 
 80. Cronbach’s alpha = .88. 
 81. F(1, 193) = 54.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .198; Mean (reckless) = 4.46; Mean (not reckless) = 3.15. 
 82. F(1, 193) = 32.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .119; Mean (bad) = 4.32; Mean (good) = 3.33. 
 83. z = 3.45, p < .001. 
 84. z = 4.66, p < .001. 
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was, and when they thought about Nathan to what extent they felt disgust, 
contempt, and compassion. The compassion item was reverse coded. All five 
items were correlated,85 and were combined into an index of negative moral 
emotion. 
The two independent variables—mens rea and character—influenced 
participants’ negative moral emotion. Specifically, when participants learned 
that Nathan acted with a reckless state of mind, participants’ moral emotions 
were more negative than if Nathan’s state of mind was described as not 
reckless.86 Similarly, reading about “bad Nathan” led participants to experience 
more negative emotion than reading about “good Nathan.”87 There was no 
statistically significant interaction between state of mind and character.88 
The fact that mens rea and moral character each influenced both moral 
emotion and overall responsibility raises the question of whether negative 
moral emotion mediates the relationship between character and overall 
responsibility, as well as the relationship between mens rea and overall 
responsibility. Assuming that negative emotion could mediate the relationship 
between moral character and perceptions of overall responsibility,89 we 
investigated its statistical significance by first testing whether there is a 
relationship between character and participants’ experiences of negative 
emotion. We found that, indeed, these two factors were related.90 A second 
regression showed that character influenced perceptions of overall 
responsibility.91 Then we regressed perceptions of overall responsibility on 
character and moral emotion simultaneously, and found that moral emotion 
predicts perceptions of overall responsibility after controlling for character.92 
Character no longer predicted overall responsibility after controlling for moral 
emotion.93 The indirect nature of the effect of character on perceptions of 
responsibility was further confirmed using a bootstrapping procedure.94 It is 
therefore possible that learning about harm caused by an actor with a bad moral 
character leads to negative moral emotion, which in turn leads to strong 
 
 85. Cronbach’s alpha = .84. 
 86. F(1, 190) = 27.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .092; Mean (reckless) = 4.21; Mean (not reckless) = 3.34. 
 87. F(1, 190) = 79.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .269; Mean (bad) = 4.55; Mean (good) = 3.04. 
 88. F(1, 190) = 1.89, p = .17.  
 89. See Klaus Fiedler et al., What Mediation Analysis Can (Not) Do, J. 47 EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1231 (2011) (describing how statistical mediation analysis can “examine the degree to which 
a third variable (Z) accounts for the influence of an independent (X) on a dependent variable (Y) 
conditional on the assumption that Z actually is a mediator”). 
 90. β = 1.51, t(190) = 8.24, p < .001. 
 91. β = 1.04, t(190) = 5.06, p < .001. 
 92. β = .62, t(190) = 9.04, p < .001. 
 93. β = .09, t(190) = .46, p = .64. 
 94. See Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for 
Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models, 40 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 879 
(2008). Using 5000 bootstrapped resamples of the data, the analysis revealed a 95% confidence interval 
of .64 to 1.23. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling procedure which does not impose the 
assumption of normality of the sampling distribution. Id. at 880. 
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attributions of blame and responsibility. 
At the same time it is also possible that stronger mens rea (that is, 
recklessness) leads perceivers to experience negative moral emotion, which in 
turn leads to greater attributions of blame and responsibility. We tested the 
statistical significance of this hypothesized relationship by first testing whether 
there is a relationship between Nathan’s mens rea and participants’ experience 
of negative emotion, and found that indeed, these two factors are related.95 A 
second regression showed that Nathan’s mens rea influenced perceptions of 
overall responsibility.96 Then we regressed perceptions of overall responsibility 
on mens rea and moral emotion simultaneously, and found that moral emotion 
predicts perceptions of overall responsibility after controlling for mens rea.97 
However, mens rea still predicted overall responsibility after controlling for 
moral emotion.98 Thus, it seems implausible that moral emotion mediates the 
relationship between mens rea and attributions of blame and responsibility. 
One question not yet addressed is the extent to which people consciously 
endorse the idea of using the moral character of the actor to gauge judgments of 
blame, causation, and intent. It is possible that when we judge blame and 
responsibility for harm, we deliberately take into account the actor’s moral 
character. It might be, for example, that we explicitly infer that a person with a 
bad character has caused undetected harms in the past, so that he deserves to be 
blamed and punished more now that he is caught. On the other hand, it is 
possible that when we take account of moral character in blame judgments, we 
do so without even realizing it. It might be, for example, when confronted with 
two identical harms committed by actors with identical mental states, we would 
disavow blaming and punishing differently based upon differences in the actors’ 
moral character. 
8. Illuminating the Influence of Moral Character 
To investigate the extent to which people explicitly endorse using moral 
character information to assess an actor’s responsibility, intentionality, and 
deserved punishment, a follow up experiment was conducted. The experiment 
was identical to the first experiment presented in this article, with one key 
exception: this time, each participant made judgments about both “good 
Nathan” and “bad Nathan.” The recklessness manipulation remained, as in the 
first experiment between subjects. Thus, each participant received two versions 
of the story. In the reckless version, participants assessed the blameworthiness 
of reckless “good Nathan” and reckless “bad Nathan.” In the not-reckless 
version, participants assessed the blameworthiness of non-reckless “good 
Nathan” and non-reckless “bad Nathan.” The order of presentation of good 
and bad moral character was counter balanced, so that half the participants 
 
 95. β = -.88, t(190) = -4.29, p < .001. 
 96. β = -1.22, t(190) = -6.12, p < .001. 
 97. β = .56, t(190) = 9.53, p < .001. 
 98. β = -.76, t(190) = -4.37, p < .001. 
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rated “good Nathan” first and then “bad Nathan” and half did the reverse. 
Using this method, we assessed the extent to which participants would try to 
keep their assessments of Nathan’s blameworthiness consistent across the two 
versions of the story that differed only according to Nathan’s moral character. 
The participants in this follow-up study—Experiment 2—were recruited in 
the same method as the first study, using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web 
service. A total of forty-eight participants completed the questionnaire, and 
were paid $1.50 each.99 The results revealed that the differences in perceptions 
of responsibility, cause, intent, foreseeability, and punishment demonstrated in 
the first experiment disappeared when each participant judged both “good 
Nathan” and “bad Nathan.”100 This is illustrated in Figure 6, which depicts 
overall responsibility judgments in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. When 
participants judged the overall responsibility of just one version of Nathan in 
Experiment 1, their judgment was influenced by Nathan’s moral character. This 
was true regardless of whether Nathan’s state of mind was described as reckless 
(left panel of Figure 6) or not reckless (right panel of Figure 6). Note that these 
statistically significant differences in overall responsibility judgments 
disappeared in Experiment 2, when each participant read two stories (about 
“good Nathan” and “bad Nathan”) and made two overall responsibility 
judgments. In this context, participants now perceived Nathan’s overall 
responsibility roughly the same, regardless of whether his moral character was 
good or bad. The statistically significant differences in perceived responsibility 
based on the actor’s moral character disappeared when differences in moral 
character were made explicit.101 
  
 
 99. Because the design of this experiment was within-subjects, we were able to achieve sufficient 
statistical power for hypothesis testing using a smaller number of participants. 
 100. Causation(reckless): Mean(good) = 6.50; Mean(bad) = 6.62. Causation(not reckless): 
Mean(good) = 5.95; Mean(bad) = 6.09. Intent(reckless): Mean(good) = 3.16; Mean(bad) = 3.31. 
Intent(not reckless): Mean(good) = 1.64; Mean(bad) = 1.82. Foreseeable(reckless): Mean(good) = 3.85; 
Mean(bad) = 4.04. Foreseeable(not reckless): Mean(good) = 2.73; Mean(bad) = 2.86. Punish(reckless): 
Mean(good) = 4.73; Mean(bad) = 4.98. Punish(not reckless): Mean(good) = 3.33; Mean(bad) = 3.75. All 
ts < 1.0; all ps> .60. 
 101. Reckless condition: t(49) = -0.64, p = .74. Not Reckless condition: t(42) = -0.52, p = .70. 
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Figure 6. Mean ratings of Nathan’s overall responsibility in the death of 
Alan, by moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much), 
comparing Experiment 1 (moral character between subjects) with 
Experiment 2 (within subjects). 
 
IV 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
To a large degree, liability in the criminal law is based on the notion of 
blameworthiness. For most crimes, liability requires a morally blameworthy act. 
For example, a person who uses force against another person in self defense is 
not criminally liable because under the circumstance, the act is considered not 
worthy of blame. Legal blame in criminal law is predicated on the idea that the 
actor performed a prohibited act, accompanied by a specific mental state, 
without justification or excuse. Yet, the results reported in this article provide 
further support for the idea that the blaming process is infused with motivation 
and emotion, and not dictated solely by individual acts and their consequences. 
Humans are social beings, and blame is a social process. When we observe a 
harmful outcome, our first reactions are emotional, and those emotions are 
informed by our immediate assessment of what kind of person could have 
caused this harm. On this account, a person with a bad moral character who 
causes a harmful outcome is a person who disrespects the community’s way of 
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life.102 As observers and community members, we react to such disrespect with 
moral outrage, and we experience the urge to blame and punish.103 Conversely, 
we are more willing to exculpate, at least partially, an otherwise virtuous person 
who causes harm, because his prior good deeds have in some sense licensed the 
transgression.104 
In this respect, there is some tension between the process of legal blame and 
the psychology of moral blame. The experimental results indicate that, as a 
psychological process, moral blame is sometimes informed by emotion. Our 
emotional reactions are not only a product of the act and the outcome, but also 
a product of inferences about the general virtuousness of the person who 
performed the act that caused the harm. Reading about “bad Nathan” made 
participants feel angry, disgusted, and full of contempt; these emotions then led 
to blaming and punishing “bad Nathan” more severely than “good Nathan.” 
The legal blame process is limited to considerations of mental state, conduct, 
and result; the psychological blame process includes those considerations but 
seems to involve much more, including the emotions of the perceiver and the 
moral character of the actor. Other variables, not examined here, can doubtless 
come into play in the psychological blame process, including perceptions of 
victim characteristics.105 
Legal and psychological blame processes also are in tension regarding 
assessment of the actor’s mental state. Procedures for legal blame assume an 
assessment of mental state that is independent of the moral character of the 
actor. But the results reported here show that perceptions of intent, 
foreseeability, and possibly causation can be colored by independent reasons 
for thinking the actor is a bad person (Figures 3 and 4). Remarkably, this result 
holds true even when, as here, the mental state of the actor was clearly 
specified—Nathan was described as being either aware or unaware of the 
possibility of harming someone. Therefore, even when mental state is 
“knowable,” we construct mental state from more than just inferences 
 
 102. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., People as Intuitive Prosecutors: The Impact of Social-Control Goals 
on Attributions of Responsibility, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196 (2007) (describing 
disrespect for a way of life as a source for outrage). 
 103. See Kahneman & Sunstein, supra note 51; SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: 
RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 33 (1998) (“[P]unishment is deserved 
according to the wrongdoer’s choice to disregard another’s value.”). 
 104. See Daniel A. Effron & Benoît Monin, Letting People Off the Hook: When Do Good Deeds 
Excuse Transgressions?, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1618, 1621–23 (2010) (showing that 
good deeds reduce condemnation when they are in a different domain (for example, crusading against 
drugs) than the subsequent transgression (for example, committing sexual harassment)). 
 105. See Mitchell J. Callan et al., The Consequences of Victim Physical Attractiveness on Reactions to 
Injustice: The Role of Observers’ Belief in a Just World, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 433, 441 (2007) (“[W]e 
found clear evidence that the death of a physically attractive versus less attractive victim increased 
participants’ punishment reactions.”); Mary R. Rose et al., Appropriately Upset? Emotion Norms and 
Perceptions of Crime Victims, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 203 (2006) (examining the possibility that 
victims expressing less emotion may have less punishment assigned to the offender); Janice Nadler & 
Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 
434–37 (2003) (noting that victim characteristics can influence punishment judgments). 
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surrounding the act itself, but also inferences about the goodness or badness of 
the person who performed it. We give the benefit of the doubt to a person with 
a virtuous character who causes harm: we perceive his actions as less intentional 
and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less foreseeable than if his character 
is flawed. Thus, compared to the unreliable loafer, the reliable employee who 
helps the local animal shelter and pitches in when his family needs help is 
blamed and punished less harshly, and we align our perceptions of his mental 
state and the harm’s foreseeability accordingly. Remarkably, it seems that we 
do not deliberately use character information to inform responsibility 
judgments, for when differences in character are made explicit, as in 
Experiment 2, we moderate our responsibility judgments so that we hold the 
virtuous harmdoer equally responsible as the ignoble harmdoer. 
It is not clear why we would want to disavow the influence of the actor’s 
character in our judgments of blame and responsibility. After all, a person who 
is an unreliable worker and an irresponsible son has demonstrated that he holds 
“an attitude of indifference to the welfare of others.”106 Our impulse to more 
harshly blame “bad Nathan” for causing the death of the skier perhaps reflects 
the inference that just as he was indifferent to his employer, to the patrons he 
served in his employment, and to his parents, “bad Nathan” was also indifferent 
to the welfare of the person with whom he collided when he decided to ski in a 
dangerous fashion. This inference may or may not accurately reflect “bad 
Nathan’s” mental state, but it is an inference that is arguably reasonable to 
draw. 
Recall, as well, that this inference appears to be driven by our emotional 
reaction to Nathan. Compared to “good Nathan,” when Nathan was portrayed 
as having an ignoble character, his actions triggered more negative emotions 
involving anger, disgust, and contempt. That Nathan seemed to be indifferent to 
the welfare of the people around him made us emotionally upset, and it is these 
moral emotions that appeared to drive our impulse not only to blame and 
punish more harshly, but also to perceive Nathan as more aware of and 
intentional toward the harm, and possibly to have played a more causal role in 
it. Thus, our own emotional reactions to harm might inform our perceptions of 
the harmdoer’s mental state. Our perception of the harmdoer’s mental state can 
in turn inform our perception of the severity of the harm. In one study, when 
people received shocks they thought were intentionally given, they reported 
them to be more painful than shocks they thought were unintentional, even 
though the magnitude of the shocks was actually the same.107 Further research is 
necessary to determine whether emotional reaction or perceived intention is 
primary, or alternatively, whether each informs the other in a feedback loop. 
The results of the experiment reported here are consonant with findings 
regarding the effect of prior criminal record on actual verdicts. One study 
 
 106. See PILLSBURY, supra note 103, at 161. 
 107. Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1260, 1261 
(2008). 
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examined over 300 criminal trials and found that in cases where the evidence 
was weak, there was a positive correlation between the jury learning that the 
defendant had committed prior crimes and the likelihood of conviction.108 A 
juror who hears that the defendant had committed prior crimes might infer that 
the defendant is a bad person, which might lead to inferences about mental 
state, causation, and blame that we observed in the experiment reported here. 
Earlier experimental research also suggests that jurors who hear that the 
defendant committed prior crimes are more prone to convict, especially when 
the defendant’s prior crimes were serious in nature or similar to the current 
accusation.109 These results are consistent with the notion that when we size 
someone up as a bad person, we perceive his acts as more causal, his mental 
states more intentional, his creation of risk more foreseeable, and his 
blameworthiness greater, than a similarly situated good person. 
It is important to note, however, that the focus of this article is not on the 
narrow question of the influence of prior crimes—it is on the broader question 
of the influence of moral character writ large, however those inferences about 
moral character are made, whether through prior crimes or otherwise. Note that 
the basis for inferring bad moral character need not be extreme. In contrast to 
the prior work examining the role of serious transgressions like having 
committed a prior robbery or burglary, the experiment reported here 
manipulated relatively subtle character traits, such as being a responsible 
worker and son. The results demonstrate that we perceive badness not only in 
people who have seriously harmed others in the past, but also in those who tend 
to free ride within their own social groups; this perceived badness triggers 
evaluative emotions that push us toward more punitive attributions of mental 
state and blame. 
Moreover, unlike prior research on the influence of information about prior 
crimes on verdicts, this article focuses not specifically on verdicts, but rather on 
the more basic social–psychological question of how blaming processes work. 
The knowledge gleaned from investigating basic psychological processes of 
blame can indeed inform our understanding of how juries and judges decide on 
guilt in criminal cases and liability in tort cases. But it can do much more than 
that. When a prosecutor decides which criminal offenses to charge in the 
indictment, and later, how lenient or harsh the plea agreement will be, these 
decisions may be influenced, without her even realizing it, by her perceptions of 
the moral character of the defendant. When an injured person decides whether 
or not to make a claim in tort for compensation, that potential plaintiff’s 
decision will likely be influenced by the extent to which he blames the other 
person,110 and these attributions of blame can be intensified to the extent that 
 
 108. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 3, at 1388. 
 109. See Greene & Dodge, supra note 4, at 69; Hans & Doob, supra note 4, at 237–38; Lloyd-
Bostock, supra note 4, at 753–55; Wissler & Saks, supra note 4, at 47. 
 110. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 641 (1980) (“[People] are more likely to [see an 
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the potential plaintiff perceives the other person as a “bad guy.” When a litigant 
in a business contract dispute refuses to settle despite the fact that the offer on 
the table exceeds his own lawyer’s estimate of the expected value of going to 
trial, that stubborn refusal may, in some cases, relate to the litigant’s perception 
that the litigant on other side is a bad actor or is acting in bad faith. And, when 
a jury awards punitive damages in an amount that reflects its indignation at the 
defendant’s conduct, that indignation may derive from the perception that the 
individuals involved in the harm were putting profits ahead of human welfare,111 
leading to perceptions that these were immoral actors.112 The psychological 
process of moral blame is a fundamentally social process, and our judgments of 
blame are often attempts to address threats to the social order. 
 
 
 
experience as injurious or voice a grievance about it] if blame can be placed upon another.”). 
 111. See Kahneman & Sunstein, supra note 51. 
 112. See Reeder et al., supra note 31. 
